



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25 D. C.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Refer to I-14,925/8

Dear Mr. Kohler:

The inclosed outline, prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the requirements for the adequate inspection and control of a zone of force and arms limitations to be established in the territory of Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland, is forwarded in accordance with the request contained in your letter of 10 July.

You will note that paragraph 3 of the outline plan provides that representatives of the Western Powers would inspect all of the territory of Poland and Czechoslovakia and that part of a reunified Germany in which Soviet forces are located. Representatives of the USSR and its satellites would inspect that portion of a reunified Germany in which forces of the Western powers are located. The Department of Defense considers that the "foreign" forces mentioned in the 3rd assumption of your letter of 10 July refer to the Western Allied forces insofar as Germany is concerned and Soviet forces insofar as Czechoslovakia and Poland are concerned. It is the opinion of the Department of Defense that the US should not agree to any arrangement for a reunified Germany which does not include withdrawal of the Soviet troops from German soil as a prerequisite.

The plan contains the major components of an inspection system, i.e., aerial, ground and communications. It is considered that such an inspection system for the proposed zone would provide no assurance of warning of a surprise attack by the Soviets against the United States or its European allies. However, such an inspection system would provide a measure of warning against surprise attack by local military forces from within the zone to the nations therein and to those nations immediately adjacent thereto. In addition, I wish to reaffirm the views expressed in Secretary McElroy's 11 April 1958 letter to Secretary Dulles concerning the arrangements for limitations of forces and armaments in Central Europe.

In the event that a zone of sufficient size and military importance can be agreed upon through negotiations with the Soviet Government, it is considered that the inspection system developed in the inclosed outline plan can be expanded and made to conform to the concept of a ground and aerial inspection system to serve as at least a partial safeguard against surprise attack.

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THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED
TO THE RM/3. CENTRAL FILES

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
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In view of the fact that the outline plan is considered only as general guidance, and may require considerable refinement when the specifics become known with respect to final agreements and blueprints for the zone, it is requested that it be retained in the NOFORN category.

Sincerely yours,



ALONZO P. FOX
Lieut. General, USA (Ret'd)
Deputy Assistant Secretary

Inclosure:

Memo to Sec Def fr JCS,
dtd 6 Aug 58, Subj: "Pro-
posals on Future Status
of Europe (U)," with
Appendix and annex A & B.
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Mr. Foy Kohler
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

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Authority <u>UN0827436</u>
By <u>ML</u> NARA Date <u>2/13/90</u>